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KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION v.
DEBENEDICTIS: A "REGULATORY TAKING"?
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of eminent domain,' which is addressed in the "takings" clause
of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, focuses on the rights
of property owners to compensation when the government takes their property
for the public good. The contract clause,2 in article I of the Constitution, prohibits
laws which impair an individual's right to contract. Often, governmental regu-
lations limit these individual rights to achieve goals that promote the public in-
terest. Such governmental regulations emanate from the state's "police power,"
that is the "exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order,
safety, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional imits ...... ,"I While
these laws benefit the public, they often adversely affect individuals whose prop-
erty is regulated. Takings issues are, therefore, difficult for the courts to resolve.
The actual physical invasion cases are uniformly viewed as unconstitutional
takings, 4 but courts review taking challenges to zoning ordinances5 and nuisance
regulations6 on an ad hoc basis. The courts have developed a variety of tests
including a "diminution of value test" set forth initially by Justice Holmes in
his majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,7 and a "noxious
use" test advocated by Justice Brandeis in his Pennsylvania Coal dissent.' His-
torically, both tests have been used to determine whether a compensable taking
has occurred. Neither test is dispositive, therefore, prediction as to the outcome
of zoning and nuisance cases is problematic.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,9 involved a consti-
tutional taking challenge to the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
I The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states that: "No person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis added).
2 Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution states that: "No State shall ... make
any . ..Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
I Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 883 (Mo. 1962) (quoting 16 C.J.S. Constitutional
Law § 174 (1956)).
4 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Loretta v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
7 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Coal].
I Id. at 416 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
9 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (1987) [hereinafter cited
as DeBenedictis I1].
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Land Conservation Act,'0 and its implementing regulations. Basically, the Act
requires that mine operators take measures to prevent subsidence and maintain
the surface's natural integrity during and after mining operations. The greatest
impact of subsidence damage is upon the environment, insofar as the surface
becomes unusable and water pollution may result. Additionally, structures over
the mining operations become unsafe. In sum, these environmental and physical
factors reduce the surface's value which, in turn, affects the tax base of the
property.
In Keystone Bitiminous Coal Association v. Duncan, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals focused on the expressed legislative purpose of the Subsidence Act to
protect the environment and the property tax base. The court determined that
these legislative concerns were paramount to an individual's contract right to waive
subjacent support. In a unanimous decision, the circuit court agreed with the
district court's analysis upholding the constitutionality of the Subsidence Act. Both
courts viewed private property rights and the state's regulatory powers for the
public good as well-defined "opposites" and "nearly perfectly equal in magni-
tude,' 1 2 but found the state's interest in environmental protection as the primary
consideration.
In order to understand the DeBenedictis H holding, this Comment will first
focus upon the historical development of the takings clause and the contract
clause. Next, this Comment will consider the "diminution of value test" and "the
noxious use test," along with variations recently developed by the courts for
analyzing takings cases. Finally, this Comment will discuss how the Third Circuit
employed these tests in Keystone, and how the Supreme Court affirmed the hold-
ing of the Third Circuit in DeBenedictis I.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Initially, five coal companies and a coal association, which engaged in un-
derground mining in Pennsylvania,'3 filed suit in the District Court for the Western
,0 Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
52, §§ 1406.1 to .21 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) [hereinafter referred to as the Subsidence Act or the
Act].
" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub not.,
Keystone Bitiminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (1987). [hereinafter cited as Key-
stone Coal or Keystone].
12 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp 511 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (per
curiam), aff'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (1987) [hereinafter cited as De Benedictis 1].
,1 Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a Pennsylvania unincorporated association of bitu-
minous coal producers, brought suit individually and as represented by certain of its member com-
panies; Helvetia Coal Company, a Pennsylvania corporation; Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Company,
a Pennsylvania corporation; U.S. Steel Mining Co., Inc., a Delaware corporation, individually and
as a trustee ad litem for Keystone Bituminous Coal Association; United States Coal Company, a
Delaware corporation [hereinafter referred to as "coal companies"].
[Vol. 89
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District of Pennsylvania asserting that certain state statutes14 and regulations 5
governing subsidence' 6 damage to surface property were unconstitutional on their
face. The defendants were state officials responsible for Pennsylvania's coal mine
subsidence regulation program. 7
The coal companies, which operated bituminous coal mines in western Penn-
sylvania, purchased the right to mine coal from the surface owners in the early
1900s. Along with the right to mine the coal, the operators also obtained waivers
from the surface owners for any damage caused to the surface. In the district
court, the coal companies argued that, because of these legal contracts with the
surface owners, the Subsidence Act amounted not only to uncompensated taking
of private property for public use but also an unconstitutional impairment of the
contract clause.' 8
Since the late 1800s, Pennsylvania courts have recognized that the person who
owned the surface of the land did not own it to the center of the earth.' 9 The
surface could be separated from the different strata beneath it. There could be
as many owners as strata if the surface owner did not protect his rights in the
severance deed. In Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon," the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recognized the right to enjoy each strata even if that right was
not stated in the deed.
Then, in 1921, the Kohler Act2' drastically expanded the regulation of mine
operators, making it unlawful to conduct anthracite mining so as to cause the
14 At issue are three statutory provisions, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 1404.4, 1404.6(a), and 1406.15
in Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conversation Act.
" Also, at issue are the Department of Environmental Resources regulations, 25 Pa. Code §§
89.145, 89.146, and 89.147(b) (Shepard's 1985), which implement the provisions and the requirements
of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982
& Supp. I 1983) [hereinafter referred to as SMCRA].
16 "Subsidence" is defined as "the process of falling, lowering, or flattening out ... so as to
form a depression ... ." XVEBsTER'S THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DiCTIONARY 2279 (14th ed. 1961).
" Peter S. Duncan was sued individually and in his capacity as Secretary of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. Philip Zullo was sued individually and in
his capacity as Chief, Division of Mine Subsidence of the Bureau of Mining and Reclamation of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources. Thomas B. Alexander was
sued individually and in his capacity as Chief, Section of Mine Subsidence Regulation of the Division
of Mine Subsidence of the Bureau of Mining and Reclamation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Environmental Resources [hereinafter referred to collectively as DER].
11 Pennyslvania state courts recognize the "third estate" in land, that being the surface, the
mineral rights, and the right of subjacent support. The concept developed in three cases: Graff Furnace
Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 244 Pa. 592, 91 A. 508 (1914); Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 100 A.
1043 (1917); and Charnetski v. Miners Mills Coal Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683 (1921) and is still
recognized today.
11 See Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 22 A. 1035 (1891).
Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893).
2 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§ 661-71 (Purdon 1954) [hereinafter referred to as Kohler Act].
19871
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collapse of public structures. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court held the
Kohler Act unconstitutional because the statute did not "disclose a public interest
sufficient to warrant so extensive of a destruction of the ... constitutionally
protected rights" without compensation.?
In 1966, the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conser-
vation Act was enacted. In 1980, amendments and implementing regulations were
passed pursuant to the requirements of federal law,23 creating Pennsylvania's cur-
rent bituminous coal mining regulatory program. The coal companies felt that
this new legislation, like the Kohler Act which preceded it, created an unconsti-
tutional demand upon the property rights for which they had contracted, and
should be overturned. The coal companies challenged three basic aspects of the
legislation in the district court.
First, the plaintiffs attacked the requirement that a certain amount of coal
be left in the ground for support under "[a]ny public building or any non-com-
mercial structure customarily used by the public including ... churches, schools,
hospitals . . ." and "[any dwelling used for human habitation ... unless the
current owner of the structure consents and the resulting damage is fully repaired
or compensated. "24 These provisions apply even if the mineral owner is also the
surface owner.? The coal companies alleged that these provisions constituted a
taking violation under the fifth amendment of the Constitution because they were
not compensated. This argument rested almost entirely on the reasoning in Penn-
sylvania Coal.26
Second, the plaintiffs challenged section 6 of the Subsidence Act which re-
quires mine operators to compensate the surface owner for subsidence damage.
The implementing regulation requires mine operators to repair any damage to the
surface caused by subsidence, to the extent technically feasible.2 7 These provisions
are enforceable notwithstanding a damage waiver signed by the surface owners
and held by the coal company.n The coal companies asserted that this violated
the contract clause of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and
the takings clause, again because they were not compensated.
Finally, section 15 of the Subsidence Act gives surface owners, not otherwise
protected by other sections of the Act, the right to protect the surface integrity
22Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
SMCRA provides that a state may assume primary control over reclamation activities within
its borders by adopting a regulatory scheme at least as stringent as the minimum guidelines set forth
in the federal act. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 938.1 to .21 (1983).
2,Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 711 (emphasis added).
Brief for Appellee at 7, Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d 707.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393.
2,Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 711.
2 Id.
[Vol. 89
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by purchasing the underlying coal even though this right may have been waived.
The coal companies asserted that this section was an invalid exercise of eminent
domain under the fourteenth amendment. 29 The plaintiff coal companies ration-
alized that, if they had originally purchased the mining rights and could not
exhaust the mineable coal, then they should be compensated for the coal they
were not allowed to mine.
The DER maintained that the legislative purpose of the Subsidence Act was
to prevent damage from mine subsidence. Such subsidence damage resulted in a
reduction in property values, thus decreasing the tax base. The Act was intended
to preserve this tax base for certain municipalities in order to enhance the state's
economic welfare. The statute was passed, therefore, pursuant to the state's "po-
lice power" to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the Com-
monwealth.30 The district court found the legislative purpose legitimate because
the "damage from mine subsidence caused a very clear and present damage to
the health, safety and welfare of the people of Pennsylvania."31 Both the leg-
islature and the district court recognized that the prevention of subsidence damage
was "related to the economic future and well-being of Pennsylvania." ' a2 The dis-
trict court held that the state law and regulations were not facially unconstitutional33
because the legislation did not exceed the inherent police power of the state. Since
the coal companies did not allege any particular injury suffered from the en-
forcement of the Subsidence Act, the only question remaining was whether the
Act and regulations constituted a taking. 34
The district court identified four general guidelines for identifying a taking.
These guidelines included a determination of: (1) Whether there has been a per-
manent physical occupation of private land by the government; (2) whether the
Subsidence Act was reasonably necessary to protect health, safety, and welfare;
(3) whether the statute created a general easement for the public; and (4) whether
the coal companies were still able to receive some profit,35 thus, only partially
affecting their rights.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower
court decision. Judge Adams, writing for the court, held that the statute and
regulations protecting surface owners from subsidence damage were not violative
of the takings or contract clauses, nor did they constitute an invalid exercise of
29 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. Const amend. XIV, § 1.
" Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 1406.3(4) (Purdon Supp. 1984).
" Id.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, at § 1406.3(3).
' The district court opinion as to the constitutionality "as applied" is pending.
31 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 718.
11 DeBenedictis I, 581 F. Supp. at 517.
1987]
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eminent domain.3 6 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit
decision in a five to four decision.
III. PRIOR HISTORY
The appeals court's analysis which was approved by the Supreme Court in
DeBenedictis II embraces three areas of subsidence law: First, the court reviewed
both the statutory development of the Subsidence Act and a prior similar law37
which was held unconstitutional as an unauthorized use of the state's "police
power"; second, the court discussed the prior history of the takings clause in the
fifth amendment; and finally, the court analyzed the contract clause in article I,
section 10 of the United States Constitution. All three areas must be historically
developed in greater detail to fully understand the DeBenedictis I1 decision.
A. The Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act
Until the passage of the Subsidence Act, coal mine operators had been able
to extract the maximum amount of mineable coal, regardless of the possible dam-
age to the surface, simply by obtaining a waiver of support from the surface
owner. Because of the Subsidence Act and its corresponding regulations, the sur-
face owners now have an absolute right of subjacent support, whether or not a
contract of waiver exists.
In Pennsylvania, three estates in land are recognized: the surface, the minerals,
and subjacent support. 38 Pennsylvania is one of the few states which recognizes
the right of support as a distinct estate in land.39 In fact, this third estate in land
may be vested in someone other than the mineral or surface owner.40 Although
no cases demonstrate this occurrence, and no one other than the surface or mineral
owners would appear to have an interest, the state has shown an interest in this
third estate through its police power.
Pennsylvania adopted the English view that the surface owner is entitled to
support of the land in its natural state. This right to support was held absolute
in Jones v. Wagner.41 Since Jones, Pennsylvania courts have rejected defenses
that mining operations were conducted according to the custom of the industry 42
Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 708.
37 See supra note 21.
31 Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81 (1875).
31 Charnetski, 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683.
41 Captline v. County of Allegheny, 74 Pa. Commw. 85, 459 A.2d 1298 (1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 904 (1984).
41 Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429 (1870).
11 Id. at 435.
[Vol. 89
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or that support was ordinarily sufficient but failed for a particular structure.
Obviously, there was no right to surface support if the same person owned
both the mineral and surface estate. The natural right of support incident to
surface ownership was created by a severance deed. A Pennsylvania court held
that once there had been a horizontal severance, the surface owner was limited
in the use and enjoyment of his estate to the extent that he must provide the
mineral owner with access. 43 The mineral estate's only allowable use, the removal
of coal, was heavily burdened by Jones' subjacent support requirement. 44 The
mineral estate is determinable because, once the coal is exhausted, the mineral
owner's interest terminates and this space previously occupied by the coal reverts
to the surface owner; 45 therefore, no further enjoyment or use of the coal exists.
At common law, the proprietary right of subjacent support attached to the
surface based upon the assumption that such support was necessary to enjoy and
use the land.4 6 In Jones, the defendant coal company was held liable for subsidence
damage caused to a building. Even though the building had been erected after
the horizontal partition of the estate, the court found "the owner of the mineral
estate... owes a servitude to the superincumbent estate, of sufficient supports;
consequently the failure to do so is negligent. ... .. 47Jones recognized the surface
owner's right to waive subjacent support by stating that the "[c]ontract may
devote the whole of the minerals to the enjoyment of the purchaser, without
supports, if the parties choose," ' 4 but "[i]f not [waived], the loss by maintaining
pillars or putting in props will necessarily come out of the value of the mineral
estate."
49
In 1880, the right to waive support was recognized only by an express agree-
ment.5 0 The mineral owner who received from the surface owner a release from
liability for loss of subjacent support not only had a contractual release from
future contingent liability, but also a covenant running with the land.-1 This bound
successors of the surface estate to the original contract,5 2 leaving them at the
mercy of the mineral owners. These early cases scrutinized the absolute right to
contract and, with the development of case law, as well as the increase of mining
operations in Pennsylvania, the legislature became sensitive to the need for sub-
sidence legislation. 3
4' Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 255 (1906).
"Id.
41 Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 222 (1943).
,6 Jones, 66 Pa. 429.
4, Id. at 435.
49 Id.
49 Id.
Carlin v. Chappel, 101 Pa. 348 (1882).
" Homer v. Watson, 79 Pa. 242 (1875).
5 Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15, 23 (1880).
Noonan, 200 Pa. at 478, 50 A. at 258.
1987]
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In 1913, the Pennsylvania General Assembly made it unlawful to remove
necessary support beneath streets and public ways without utilizing permanent
and adequate artificial supports.54 In 1921, the Kohler Act expanded the regulation
of anthracite mine operators. But in 1922, the United States Supreme Court, in
Pennsylvania Coal,s held the Kohler Act to be an unconstitutional use of police
power. The Pennsylvania Legislature reacted to Pennsylvania Coal by enacting
a statute in 1937 which replaced absolute liability for subsidence with a "fault
concept" under which a mineral owner would be liable only when his act caused
an "unreasonable risk of harm to the surface." '5 6
Although the creation of a subsidence committee by the Pennsylvania Leg-
islature in 1956 provided no remedy for those actually damaged by subsidence,
it did allow for notice to be given in surface deeds that coal or support rights
were not transferred. 7 In 1961, the committee reenacted many provisions of the
Kohler Act and added a declaration of legislative purpose as well as a guide for
mining operators."
Finally, the original Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act
was enacted in 1966.19 The legislature included a lengthy statement of purpose
and a declaration of public policy concerns. The basic premise of the Subsidence
Act was that, regardless of the right to waive subjacent support by the surface
owner, the state has the right through its police power to require subjacent support
for the benefit and protection of the community.
Pennsylvania was the forerunner of subsidence regulations. Not until 1977,
in response to a national ecological threat, did Congress enact the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). 60 Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act is more
demanding upon operators than the Federal Act.
B. The Takings Clause
Since the fourteenth amendment's adoption:
compensation for private property taken for public uses constitutes an essential
element in "due process of law," and that without such compensation the ap-
propriation of private property to public uses, no matter under what form of
- Comment, Mine Subsidence Legislation in Pennsylvania and the Developing Concept of the
Police Power, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 835, 839 (1966).
" Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393.
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit 52, § 1407(d) (Purdon 1954).
57 Id.
11 Comment, supra note 54, at 842-43.
11 Id. at 844.
6 The purpose of SMCRA is to establish a nationwide program to protect society and the
environment from the adverse effects of surface mining operations and to assure that the rights of
surface landowners are fully protected from such operations.
[Vol. 89
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procedure it is taken, would violate the provisions of the federal constitution.6
Pursuant to its police powers, the state may take or regulate the use of prop-
erty to promote the public good. 62 This concept of eminent domain recognizes
that a taking requires compensation, but does not include the notion that a reg-
ulation, which only infringes upon an individual's property rights, requires com-
pensation. 63 A government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the
general welfare. Often this adjustment curtails some potential use of private prop-
erty. To require compensation in all circumstances would effectively compel the
government to regulate by purchase. 64 "Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law. ' ' 65 The facts of each case will determine
whether a taking occurs. Balancing of the factors involved in each case has not
provided a definitive guide. Takings have been decided using various elements
and tests, none of which alone are determinative.
The Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged that it is unable to develop
a single test or formula for determining whether a particular government regu-
lation of private property constitutes a taking. 6 Commentators have characterized
the Court's ad hoc approach as a "crazy quilt pattern" 67 and a "mosaic, ' 6 but
important distinctions have surfaced. A 'taking' may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by [the] government . "... ,69 When permanent physical invasions are held as tak-
ings, just compensation, is required, as demonstrated in a number of recent Su-
preme Court cases.
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,70 the Court held that the application of the
federal navigational servitude7' to a lagoon on the island of Oahu in Hawaii
constituted a taking, requiring compensation. A land developer had converted a
private pond into a marina which he connected by canal to the ocean. The gov-
61 Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 F. 385, 396 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888).
6 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 712.
'3 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
14 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
'3 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
66 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
67 Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: 30 Years of Supreme Court Expropri-
ation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63.
6' Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 465, 468 (1983).
69 Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883
(1978).
10 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164.
71 Navigational servitude is defined as the "public right of navigation for the use of the people
at large." BLACK's LAW DiCTiONARY 927 (5th ed. 1979).
1987]
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ernment claimed the connection made the canal a "navigable water" of the United
States, subject to regulation by the federal government. However, the government
could not require public use of the private marina without invoking eminent do-
main. The Court held the government's action went "beyond ordinary regulation"72
and that converting private property to public use required just compensation.
The Supreme Court again held in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV
Corp.73 that actual physical invasion required just compensation. Loretto
dealt with the constitutionality of a New York statute which required owners of
rental properties to allow installation of cable television transmission facilities.
In holding that a "permanent physical occupation of property is a taking, '11 4
Loretto confirmed the distinction between regulation and public use, employing
a rationale the Court developed nearly 100 years previously:
[t]he restriction imposed by the constitution [is] to the effect that statutes passed
in the exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth must not be repugnant
or contrary to the constitution, one of the provisions of which is, that the owner
of private property, appropriated to public uses, shall receive a reasonable com-
pensation there-for....
Undoubtedly, the State, without taking the title to itself, may, in some appropriate
mode and without compensation to the owner, forbid the use of specified private
property, where such use would be injurious to the public health....
The difference [is] between an act passed with exclusive reference to the police
power of the State, without any purpose to take and apply property to public
uses, and a statute... for the general good, [which] ordains and establishes reg-
ulations declaring the existence of a nuisance. .... 7.
The Court has extended the physical invasion category of the takings clause
to include some cases in which a government activity physically invades an ease-
ment in property. 76 In 1922, resort hotel owners claimed that the government's
placement of a gun battery near the hotel impaired the land's recreational value
so as to constitute a taking.77 Two prior decisions78 by the Supreme Court had
rejected the same claim because the government displayed no intent of depriving
the owner of the hotel's profitable use. 79 Recognizing the potential for a taking,
72 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178.
71 Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
14 Id. at 441 (emphasis in original).
71 Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398-99 (1895).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
" Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
71 Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co.
v. United States, 250 U.S. 1 (1919).
79 Peabody, 231 U.S. at 538.
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Justice Holmes reversed the trial court's dismissal of the 1922 decision. The Su-
preme Court ordered the Court of Claims to hear evidence to determine whether
the cumulative effect of the overt firings from the gun battery were sufficient to
prove an intent to create a servitude over the hotel's property.A0
In United States v. Causby,8' the Supreme Court held that regular and fre-
quent flights of military planes over the plaintiff's land created an easement for
the government's benefit which required payment of compensation. The plaintiffs
in Causby owned a small chicken farm near a military airport whose glidepath
was only eighty-three feet above their property. The use of the runway disturbed
the farm to the extent that the plaintiffs had to discontinue their chicken business.
The Court held that the landowners were entitled to as much air space over the
land as necessary to allow their farm to exist 2 and ordered compensation.
Aside from the actual physical invasion cases, courts have taken an ad hoc
approach, balancing various factors to determine when a taking has occurred.
The courts must look to the facts of each case involving such a decision.
Justice Holmes' majority opinion and Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsyl-
vania Coal illustrate the diverse methodology of the Court's takings analysis. In
Pennsylvania Coal, Mahon's land and house had subsided. A predecessor in title
had contracted away the right to subjacent support. Nonetheless, Mahon con-
tended that the Kohler Act required the coal company, which had the mining
rights, to maintain subjacent support. The plaintiff coal company challenged the
validity of the statute because it protected the rights of only a small group of
private citizens, not the public. The coal company argued that because the statute
mandated subjacent support, the amount of mineable coal was reduced, which
the coal company charged amounted to a taking without just compensation.
Justice Holmes' majority opinion held that the Kohler Act could not be sus-
tained as a valid exercise of police power"3 because the "statute [did] not disclose
a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's
constitutionally protected rights. '8 4 Holmes' decision focused on the "magnitude
of the burden imposed,""5 or what has been called the "diminution of value
theory.' '86 Holmes found that a statute making it commercially impractical to
mine certain coal has nearly the same effect, in the constitutional sense, as an
appropriation. 7
Portsmouth Harbor, 260 U.S. at 330.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256.
*2 Id. at 265.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
94 Id.
as Id.
Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907).
17 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 41 (1964).
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. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal relied on different factors than
considered under the diminution of value theory. Brandeis reasoned that the re-
striction in the Kohler Act was merely a prohibition of a "noxious use," a test
often used to distinguish a valid regulation from a taking. Furthermore, the par-
amount rights of the public"s outweighed the individual's property rights. Brandeis
concluded that the Kohler Act was a valid exercise of the police power, 9 and
not a taking.
The theory underlying Brandeis' dissent emanated from Mugler v. Kansas,9°
a case which interpreted a Kansas statute prohibiting the manufacture of liquor.
In Mugler, the plaintiff manufactured beer for several years prior to the passage
of the statute. He argued that the mere passage of the statute was a taking of
his plant and equipment without compensation. The Court recognized that the
property's value would diminish significantly, 9' but held that the statute did not
impair any constitutional liberty or property interest of alcohol manufacturers.92
The regulation was not an exercise of eminent domain because a mere prohibition
on the use of property for purposes which are declared by valid legislation to be
injurious to the "health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot in any sense,
be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit." 93 In
essence, this "noxious use" test used in Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal
and Harlan's opinion in Mugler, requires a finding by a legislative body that a
particular use of property is offensive and should be prohibited as a matter of
public policy. Once the legislative body identifies an offensive use, the Court will
scrutinize whether the act prohibiting it was an "unreasonable and arbitrary
exercise" 94 of authority. If the Court finds the act not arbitrary or unreasonable,
the prohibition stands, and no compensation is due. 95 If arbitrary or unreasonable,
compensation is required.
The taking question often arises in land use cases. Land use regulations require
ad hoc analysis to determine if a taking has occurred, and courts often rely upon
the public benefit aspect. In 1926, the Supreme Court first addressed the con-
stitutionality of a comprehensive land use law in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,6 restrictively regulating the location of trades, industries, and
apartments, as well as the size and height of buildings.9 7 The zoning ordinance
:1 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
s9 Id. at 417.
90 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
91 Id. at 656-57.
92 Id. at 668-69.
93 Id.
94 Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 177 (1915).
11 See, e.g., Mugler, 123 U.S. 623 and Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
I Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365.
" Id. at 379-80.
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was attacked on the ground that it deprived the owner of the value of his property
if zoned adversely; and was also challenged on due process and equal protection
grounds. The Court found that the statute's enactment was a proper exercise of
police power because of sufficient public interest in the segregation of incom-
patible land uses to justify the diminution of certain property values. 98 Courts
interpreting zoning ordinances continue to stress that the restriction "cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare." 99
In 1962, the Supreme Court, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,'°° deter-
mined the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. The town, in attempting to
restrict a quarry, established a regulation which prohibited excavation below the
water line, which effectively eliminated the use to which the property had pre-
viously been devoted.10' The Court upheld the statute's validity reasoning that the
"interest of the public... require[d] such interference; and [secondly] that the
means [were] reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals."102
The Court often balances the public interest against private interests when
no actual physical intrusion exists.' 3 Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City was one such case in which the Court applied the "distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations" test.'m In Penn Central, the Court interpreted the
constitutionality of a landmark preservation act which allowed owners of historical
buildings to transfer development rights to mitigate the loss of investment ex-
pectations.0 5 Because the Court found that the legitimate public concern regarding
historic preservation was paramount to the developers' investment-backed expec-
tations, the restriction was a valid exercise of the state's police power and did
not amount to a taking.'/6
Emergency legislation rarely has been deemed a taking. For example, in United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,' °7 a government regulation requiring
nonessential gold mines to cease operation was not considered a taking. War
demanded strict control of resources and the regulation was the only reasonable
means to achieve the desired result.
11 Id. at 389-90.
19 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
10 Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590.
I Id. at 591.
10 Id. at 595 (quoting Lawton v. Steel, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
203 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314
(1981).
104 Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 124.
101 Id. at 109-12.
116 Id. at 138.
101 United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
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Determining the line between permissible police power regulations and im-
permissible uncompensable takings for public use has not always been an easy
task for the Supreme Court.108 Each case is closely scrutinized as to its particular
facts and, as previously discussed, various tests have been used to determine the
legitimacy of the state's action.
C. Contract Clause
The importance of the contract clause is evident from its inclusion in the
original articles of the Constitution. The contract clause's purpose was to address
post-Revolutionary War state legislation which allowed repudiation of British
creditors. Although the contract clause prohibited state legislation repudiating
contracts between private parties, the Supreme Court extended its coverage to
prohibit a state's repudiation of its own contract.'09 However, when a state was
a party to a contract, the scrutiny was more relaxed." 0 In contrast, laws alleged
to impair the obligations of contracts between private parties were more closely
scrutinized.'
In 1934, the Supreme Court reversed this position, holding that the contract
clause should not be read as a serious impediment to social and economic leg-
islation affecting private contracts. In Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell,12 the Court examined a state law enacted as an emergency measure
during the depression extending redemption periods on mortgages. The Court held
that the extension of the redemption period did not violate the contract clause
because "[tlhe economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of
its... protective powers notwithstanding interference with contracts.""' The Court
employed a means-ends analysis in Blaisdell, reasoning that "[t]he question is not
whether legislation affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but
whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken
are reasonable and appropriate to the end."1" 4
The language of the contract clause appears to contain an absolute prohibition
on the impairment to contract. Nonetheless, the Court found in Blaisdell, that
" Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 300 (3d. Cir. 1984) (citing Agins, 447 U.S. 255; Penn
Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590).
"I Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-39 (1810).
110 See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 432 (1837); Stone
v. Miss., 101 U.S. 814, 817-20 (1879); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667-
70 (1878).
- The Court consistently held that any state law which retroactively changed the obligations of
debtors violated the contract clause. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213, 260-70
(1827); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 84-85 (1821).
M Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
" Id. at 437.
14 Id. at 438.
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the prohibition must accommodate the inherent police power of a state "to safe-
guard the vital interest of its people.""' 5 Again, the state's police power to protect
the community overrides a constitutionally protected right.
In 1977, the Court reaffirmed its position in Blaisdell. In United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey,"6 the Supreme Court struck down New Jersey legislation
which allowed the repudiation of a covenant between the state and bondholders.
The Court justified its higher standard of scrutiny, reasoning that, when a state
is a party to a contract, "complete deference to a legislative assessment of rea-
sonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the state's self-interest is at
stake."" 7
The most recent Supreme Court decision considering impairment of private
contracts was Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co."8
In Energy Reserves, a Kansas statute had imposed a price ceiling on newly
discovered gas which was lower than the amount charged on gas previously
purchased through a long-term contract. Justice Blackmun analyzed the im-
pairment of contract challenge using a three-step approach. The threshold in-
quiry was whether the state law operated "as a substantial impairment of a con-
tractual relationship."" 9 If so, the second question was whether "the state, in
justification, [had] a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regu-
lation. . .such as remedying a broad and general social or economic problem."' 120
The final inquiry was .'.whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities
of contracting parties [was based] upon reasonable conditions and [was] of a
character appropriate to public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption."' 2'
If the state is not a party, legislative intent should control.'22 If the state is
a party, the court must inquire whether a less drastic modification is sufficient
and whether the legislation is reasonable in light of the circumstances.'2
Remedying broad social or economic problems is a sufficient public purpose
for the state to override the contract clause. The requirement of a legitimate public
purpose guarantees that the state is exercising its police power in an appropriate
manner, rather than providing a benefit to special interests. In certain contexts,
the prohibitions of the contract clause must occasionally give way to the state's
legitimate goals.
M Id. at 434.
M16 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
"W Id. at 26.
' Energy Reserve Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
,9 Id. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244, reh'g denied,
439 U.S. 886 (1978)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 411-12.
Id. (quoting United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22).
M United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22-23.
'2 Id. at 30-32; see also, Troy Ltd., 727 F.2d at 296.
1987]
15
Van Damme: Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis: A Regulator
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987
WEST VIRGINIA LA W RE VIEW
IV. THE TiaiD Cmcurr's ANALYsis IN Keystone Coal
The Third Circuit's analysis in Keystone focused on the takings and the con-
tract clauses. The takings clause analysis reviewed Pennsylvania Coal, the state's
police power, and eminent domain. The contract clause challenge to the legislation
was evaluated in light of the legitimate public purpose, 24 balanced against the
individual's right to contract.
A. Takings Clause
1. Appellant's Argument Relying upon Pennsylvania Coal
The appellants in Keystone suggested that Pennsylvania Coal should have been
particularly relevant to the Third Circuit's analysis. 25 The court recognized the
similarities between the Kohler Act as it was applied in Pennsylvania Coal, and
the Subsidence Act as applied in Keystone, but distinguished the cases on their
facts. Pennsylvania Coal was not controlling because it involved a single private
house, while Keystone dealt with the public interest. Furthermore, in Pennsylvania
Coal, Justice Holmes narrowed the holding only to apply to the government's
power to enact regulations regarding individual citizens. Holmes stated that "[a]
source of damage to such a [private] house is not a public nuisance even if similar
damage is inflicted on others in different places. The damage is not common or
public."' 2 6 The Supreme Court in DeBenedictis II found no "... indicia of a
statute enacted solely for the benefit of the private parties... present.' '2 7
Justice Holmes viewed the Kohler Act as a taking without just compensation
based on a diminution of value test. He also recognized, however, the merit of
an ad hoc approach, stating that the "question depends upon the particular
facts." 28 In that regard, Holmes criticized the Kohler Act as an unjustified pro-
tection of public safety not directed to preventing common or public damage and
not applying to all surface owners in that subjacent support was not required if
the coal company owned the surface. 29
In Keystone, the third Circuit found the Subsidence Act overcame Holmes'
criticisms of the Kohler Act. The Keystone court felt that the Subsidence Act was
a justified safety measure, which supported the tax base and served the public
interest in preserving the land. 30 Additionally, no surface owner was excluded in
124 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 717.
'z' Id. at 711.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
DeBenedictis II, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4330.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S at 413.
129 Id.
3 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 714-15.
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the Subsidence Act."' Because the legislative purpose of the Kohler Act was the
preservation of the surface owner's safety, notice to the surface owner that the
land was to be mined was sufficient to accomplish that purpose.3 2 In the Sub-
sidence Act, notice was insufficient, however, because its legislative purpose was
to "protect the environment of the Commonwealth, its economic future, and its
well-being."' 33 Therefore, other measures were necessary to accomplish that pur-
pose.134
The constitutional question in Pennsylvania Coal, turned primarily upon the
degree of economic injury imposed by the governmental regulation. In Keystone,
the court also may have been considering the degree of economic injury, but this
alone clearly was not dispositive. The plaintiffs in Pennsylvania Coal stressed that
the Kohler Act had rendered the business of mining coal commercially imprac-
ticable; the Subsidence Act was not challenged on this basis.
3 5
The rationale of Pennsylvania Coal reflected the mentality of the early 1900s
when a fear of a domestic fuel shortage was prevalent, 3 6 and before an awareness
of ecology and the effect of subsidence on the public welfare was recognized. A
more enlightened viewpoint was demonstrated in Keystone. 37
2. The Police Power Takings Analysis
The Third Circuit distinguished Pennsylvania Coal, focusing on three areas
of inquiry in its takings analysis: (1) Whether the government's action entailed
a physical invasion, (2) whether, because of the regulation, there was a diminution
in the value of the coal companies' property, and (3) the degree of interference
with the coal companies' reasonable, distinct, investment-backed expectations. 3 8
The Subsidence Act does not authorize physical invasion. Furthermore, the
court noted that no physical invasion had occurred. The support requirements
are part of a public program which promotes public good by preventing a serious
and identifiable harm.139 The court cited Penn Central to demonstrate that a
government regulation is less likely to be considered a taking when the legislative
purpose is the protection of the environment, public safety, and economic welfare
of the state. 40
' Id. at 715.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
" Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 715.
114 See supra note 15.
" Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 716, n.6.
136 DeBenedicitis II, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4329.
13 See McGinley & Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon Revisited: Is the Federal Surface Mining
Act a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an Unconstitutional Taking? 16 TULSA L.J. 418 (1981).
"I Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 715.
139 Id.
140 Id. (citing Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
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In Keystone, the appellants, relied on Pennsylvania Coal to support their
argument that there was a significant diminution of the value of their property.
This point was complicated by Pennsylvania's recognition of three estates in land. 4'
The support estate, a separate property interest, cannot be profitably used by one
who also does not possess either the mineral or surface estate.'42 The court viewed
this support estate as being one "strand in the [appellant's] bundle of property
rights.' ' 143 "[Tihe destruction of one strand of the bundle [is] not a taking, because
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."' 144 The court held, therefore, that
because the coal companies still possessed valuable mineral rights, subject only
to the prevention of subsidence, their entire bundle of property rights had not
been destroyed, 145 and no taking had resulted.
The court confronted the appellants' argument of interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations stating that the mine operator cannot expect to
profit at the public's expense. 46 The court, relying upon Penn Central, held that
even though a regulation may significantly impair investment-backed expectations,
it was not necessarily a taking if it was reasonably related to the promotion of
the general welfare. 47
A property owner's reasonable expectations as to the possible uses of his
property are always subject to interference by the state in the exercise of its police
power. 48 The court relied on Goldblatt and Mugler, finding that the Act was
enacted for the public benefit and therefore, "cannot in any just sense, be deemed
a taking. . . . 49
3. Eminent Domain
Section 1406.15 of the regulations implementing the Subsidence Act requires
coal owners to sell coal support to surface owners who are not protected by other
provisions of the Subsidence Act, in order to guarantee support of the surface
estate. In Keystone, the coal companies alleged that this was an invalid exercise
of the power of eminent domain because it served no public use."O The Third
Circuit refuted this allegation citing Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.1 Ha-
waii Housing involved a challenge to a state law that created a land condemnation
141 Id.
142 Id.
',' Id. at 716.
Id. (quoting Andnis, 444 U.S. at 66).
141 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 716.
14 Id.
147 Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127.
4 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 717.
"49 Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593 (quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69).
11 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 719.
" Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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arrangement in which titles were transferred from lessors to lessees. The legislative
purpose of the Hawaii act was to benefit the public by the decentralization of
Hawaiian oligarchic property. The landowners claimed a fifth amendment vio-
lation of due process, but the Supreme Court found that the public use require-
ment was met, therefore, the action was within the state's police power. The
Court reviewed the legislative interpretation of a public use, finding its scope was
"an extremely narrow one." 15 2 Courts must defer to legislative judgment for the
determination of a public use "unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation."'113 Based on Hawaii Housing's reasoning, the Third Circuit held in
Keystone that the public use had a reasonable foundation.
The coal companies also attacked section 1406.15 because it did not require
the surface owner to demonstrate that the coal purchased was necessary to avoid
subsidence. 54 The court again relied upon the reasoning of Hawaii Housing. The
court determined that the question was not whether the state plan was perfect
or even likely to achieve the intended goal; the constitutional requirement was
met if the legislature could have believed the Subsidence Act would promote its
stated objective. 55
B. Contract Clause Analysis
While the contract clause is absolute on its face, it must nonetheless accom-
modate the inherent police power of the state "to safeguard the vital interest of
its people.' 5 6 In Keystone, the Third Circuit acknowledged that two levels of
scrutiny are employed to evaluate challenges under the contract clause: heightened
scrutiny when the state itself is a party to the contract, and a lesser degree of
scrutiny when economic and social legislation affects a wholly private contract.
15 7
The court found the higher level of scrutiny inapplicable in Keystone, and focused
instead on an analysis of the wholly private contract.
112 Id. at 240 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
"I Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
1-4 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 719.
"' Hawaii Housing Auth., 104 S. Ct. at 242.
"' Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 410 (quoting Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434). In Man-
igault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1903), the Supreme Court states that:
[It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the ob-
ligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested
in it for the promotion of the common weal or are necessary for the general good of the
public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected.
This power, which... is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right
of the government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the
people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.
Id. at 480.
01 Energy Reserves Group Inc., 459 U.S. at 410.
1987]
19
Van Damme: Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis: A Regulator
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987
WEST VIRGINIA LA W RE VIEW
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's use of Justice Blackmun's three-
step test from Energy Reserves. The threshold inquiry was whether the state law
substantially impaired a contractual relationship." 8 All the parties in Keystone
stipulated that section 1406.6 did operate as a substantial impairment of con-
tract.1 9 Surface owners had relinquished their right to subjacent support in ninety
percent of the cases in which mineral rights were conveyed. 6' The legislation and
regulation sought to guarantee subjacent support, despite the contractual relin-
quishment of these rights.' 61 The coal companies, therefore, met the first prong
of the test.
Under the second step, the state must justify its law based on a "significant
and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation."'162 The Third Circuit believed
that the "[l]egislature expressly found subsidence damage devastated many surface
structures, and thus endangered the health, safety, and economic welfare of the
Commonwealth and its people."' 63 Thus, a legitimate public purpose was estab-
lished.
In the third part of the test, once the legitimate public purpose was identified,
the court determined whether the adjustment of the parties' rights and respon-
sibilities was based upon reasonable conditions of a character appropriate to the
legislature's public purpose.'6 The coal companies argued that the district court
did not exercise sufficient scrutiny at this third step but the Third Circuit disa-
greed. 1' The court reasoned that, because the state was not a contracting party,
the court need not inquire whether there was a less restrictive alternative or whether
the legislation was reasonable in the light of the circumstances; 1 the court only
need defer to legislative judgment. 67
The Third Circuit held that the trial court properly deferred to the legislature's
identification of important state interests in preserving the integrity of the surface.
The court cited its recent opinion in Troy Ltd. v. Renna,16 which also applied
Justice Blackmun's test. Troy deferred to legislative judgment:
assessing the reasonableness of these purposes we [the court] are admonished not
to substitute our views for those of the legislature. Because the state is not itself
a contracting party, in this sphere of economic and social regulation we "properly
"I This concept was first employed in Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 244.
119 Keystone Coal at 717-18.
160 Id.
16, Id.
6 Energy Reserves Group Inc., 459 U.S. at 411.
163 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 718.
I- United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22.
16 Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d at 718.
I- United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 30-32.
167 Id. at 22.
I- Troy Ltd., 727 F.2d 287.
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defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of" the Act.69
V. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's analysis in Keystone of the takings and contract clauses
explicitly identifies important considerations necessary to determine if a regulation
is a taking. The Third Circuit has consistently applied the same analysis to the
takings and contract clauses since its decision in Troy. There was much antici-
pation that the Supreme Court would clarify the issue when the case was brought
before it on appeal as DeBenedictis Il.
The Supreme Court only distinguished Pennsylvania Coal from Keystone,
however. The Court distinguished the facts in that the regulations in Keystone
affected a greater number of individuals in Pennsylvania via the environment and
the tax base, while in Pennsylvania Coal only a few individuals were affected.
The Court found the Subsidence Act an allowable police power regulation because
the legislature stated a legitimate purpose which the Court found difficult to
override. If the Court had overturned the Third Circuit's decision, it would have
been devastating to the state of Pennsylvania. In order to comply with the statute,
the state would have had to compensate the coal companies for the coal which
has been left in place. The actual calculations themselves would prove almost
impossible. Furthermore, the Court did not limit its affirmance of the Third
Circuit's decision to Pennsylvania because of its unique three estates in land.
The Court's inability to draw a bright-line is understandable considering the
variety of regulations which states have enacted to achieve purportedly legitimate
public goals. Furthermore, the need for an ad hoc approach is necessary given
the changing attitudes about protection of a community's health, safety, and
welfare. Justice Holmes' decision in Pennsylvania Coal was the product of a
different age. The amicus brief in support of the petitioners in Keystone seemed
to ignore these changing attitudes, relying instead on "free enterprise system"
arguments of the Holmes era. 170
Perhaps the most interesting facet of DeBenedictis II is the dissent which
could well be significant to the future of environmental and eminent domain cases.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, joined by Justices Powell, O'Con-
ner, and Scalia did not wish to "readily dismiss the precedential value of Pen-
sylvania Coal.17 1 Unlike the majority, the dissent saw little difference between the
Kohler Act and the present Subsidence Act. Regardless of whether similarities
exist or not, the fact remains that the environment would be disporportionately
affected if coal companies could mine all the underlying coal, when refraining
169 Id. at 298 (quoting Energy Reserves Group Inc., 459 U.S. at 413).
110 Brief of Amici Curiae, Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation, at 4, Keystone Coal, 771 F.2d 707.
" DeBenedictis II, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4336.
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from doing so still allows them to mine coal profitably. Noting that Justices,
Scalia and O'Conner joined the dissent, it is not improbable that the dissent will
become the majority opinion of the future.
Pennsylvania Coal may not be overruled in the near future. Other factors
have become increasingly important, however, in justifying regulations which may
adversely impact on individual rights. The Supreme Court, even with a conserv-
ative bench presiding, has become increasingly respectful of social and economic
legislation which protects society's needs. Senator Morris Udall's comment in
response to SMCRA, demonstrates his discomfort with this law because of the
admonitions in Pennsylvania Coal warning against undue interference with in-
dividual rights. While writing SMCRA, Udall stated that "[t]he balancing of pri-
vate economic interests and the public good in this exercise is tricky and
constitutional questions abound. I believe, however, that the courts will be mindful
as the Congress of the obligation of a civilized people to themselves, the envi-
ronment and the future."' 72
The Court must still respect the individual right to contract. The regulation
must still be viewed as beneficial to the public good before the contract clause
can be disregarded.
Even though the demarcation between what is a taking and what is a mere
regulation remains unclear, the Supreme Court was mindful of the Third Circuit's
attempt to identify the critical public policy concerns which are superior to the
individual's rights. Unfortunately, DeBenedictis 11 does not increase the degree
of predictability in the area of governmental regulation as to whether the reg-
ulation is tantamount to a taking and just compensation is due, or whether the
regulation is a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to further the public
good. The ad hoc approach will continue to rule in the area of governmental
regulation.
Monique Van Damme
'7 Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Ret-
rospect, 81 W. VA. L. Rsv. 553 (1979).
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